DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the equal liberty of persons that is protected by the Fifth Amendment.

By history and tradition the definition and regulation of marriage has been treated as being within the authority and realm of the separate States. Congress has enacted discrete statutes to regulate the meaning of marriage in order to further federal policy, but DOMA, with a directive applicable to over 1,000 federal statues and

the whole realm of federal regulations, has a far greater reach. Its operation is also directed to a class of persons that the laws of New York, and of 11 other States, have sought to protect. Assessing the validity of that intervention requires discussing the historical and traditional extent of state power and authority over marriage. Subject to certain constitutional guarantees, see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, “regulation of domestic relations” is “an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States,” Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 404. The significance of state responsibilities for the definition and regulation of marriage dates to the Nation’s beginning; for “when the Constitution was adopted the common understanding was that the domestic relations of husband and wife and parent and child were matters reserved to the States,” Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U. S. 379, 383–384. Marriage laws may vary from State to State, but they are consistent within each State.

DOMA rejects this long-established precept. The State’s decision to give this class of persons the right to marry conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import. But the Federal Government uses the state-defined class for the opposite purpose—to impose restrictions and disabilities. The question is whether the resulting injury and indignity is a deprivation of an essential part of the liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment, since what New York treats as alike the federal law deems unlike by a law designed to injure the same class the State seeks to protect. New York’s actions were a proper exercise of its sovereign authority. They reflect both the community’s considered perspective on the historical roots of the institution of marriage and its evolving understanding of the meaning of equality.

By seeking to injure the very class New York seeks to protect, DOMA violates basic due process and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government. The Constitution’s guarantee of equality “must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot” justify disparate treatment of that group. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, 534–535. DOMA cannot survive under these principles.

Its unusual deviation from the tradition of recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage operates to deprive same-sex couples of the benefits and responsibilities that come with federal recognition of their marriages. This is strong evidence of a law having the purpose and effect of disapproval of a class recognized and protected by state law. DOMA’s avowed purpose and practical effect are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.

DOMA’s history of enactment and its own text demonstrate that interference with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages, conferred by the States in the exercise of their sovereign power, was more than an incidental effect of the federal statute. It was its essence. BLAG’s arguments are just as candid about the congressional purpose. DOMA’s operation in practice confirms this purpose. It frustrates New York’s objective of eliminating inequality by writing inequality into the entire United States Code.

DOMA’s principal effect is to identify and make unequal a subset of state-sanctioned marriages. It contrives to deprive some couples married under the laws of their State, but not others, of both rights and responsibilities, creating two contradictory marriage regimes within the same State. It also forces same-sex couples to live as married for the purpose of state law but unmarried for the purpose of federal law, thus diminishing the stability and predictability of basic personal relations the State has found it proper to acknowledge and protect.

– SCOTUS

Here in Texas, marriage equality is a big deal for the trans community. If you recall, Araguz is the transwoman who was married to firefighter, Thomas Araguz. Thomas died in the line of duty but his ex-wife sought to have Nikki’s marriage voided because Nikki was sexed male at birth, the Texas constitution – following DOMA’s example – bans same sex marriage and therefore Nikki’s marriage is void because she is, they claim, a man:

Article 1, Section 32 of the Texas Constitution, as amended, states:

(a) Marriage in this state shall consist only of the union of one man and one woman.

(b) This state or a political subdivision of this state may not create or recognize any legal status identical or similar to marriage.

Texas Proposition 2, which was approved in 2005, put the above into Texas law and is the legal foundation for the case against Nikki. The effort to push Prop 2 through was supported by the Klan and Republicans alike.

The Texas Attorney General stated that he was going to use the gender standard coming out of the Nikki Araguz case as a guide for Texas gender policy. That meant that should Nikki’s case lose because the Texas court held that sex could never be changed and she was therefore in a same-sex marriage, the policy implications to the entire Texas transgender community would have been disastrous! The Nikki Araguz case has policy implications regarding everything from birth certificate amendments to post-transition Texas ID corrections:

A recap on Texas trans marriage issues raised by the Araguz case:

Declaring DOMA unconstitutional might seem like a huge victory. And it is. For states without  a law like the one Texas has. DOMA cannot be valid in states with a same-sex marriage law.  Texas has not such law.  This means that the Araguz isn’t rendered DOA by the SCOTUS decision today.